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Exchange Hazards, Relational Reliability, and Contracts in China:  
The Contingent Role of Legal Enforceability 
 
Abstract 
Building on institutional and transaction cost economics, this article proposes that legal 
enforceability increases the use of contract over relational reliability (e.g. beliefs that the other 
party acts in a non-opportunistic manner) to safeguard market exchanges characterized by non-
trivial hazards.  The results of 399 buyer-supplier exchanges in China show that 1) when 
managers perceive that the legal system can protect their firm’s interests, they tend to use explicit 
contracts rather than relational reliability to safeguard transactions involving risks (i.e. asset 
specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty), and 2) when managers do not 
perceive the legal system as credible, they are less likely to use contracts and instead rely on 
relational reliability to safeguard transactions associated with specialized assets and 
environmental uncertainty, but not those involving behavioral uncertainty.  We further find that 
legal enforceability does not moderate the effect of relational reliability on contracts, but does 
weaken the effect of contracts on relational reliability.  These results endorse the importance of 
prior experience (e.g., relational reliability) in supporting the use of explicit contracts, and 
alternatively suggest under conditions of greater legal enforceability, the contract signals less 
regarding one’s intention to be trustworthy but more about the efficacy of sanctions.  
 
Keywords: Transaction Cost Economics, Institutional Change, Trust, Contracts, Legal 
Enforceability, China 
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Mahoney (2005: 109) advances that “the awarding of the Nobel Prize in economics to 
Douglass North suggests that, at the least, part of the economics profession has (implicitly) 
accepted that the evolution of institutional environment toward economic efficiency often fails.” 
The conventional view of economic development suggests that formal institutions, such as courts 
and contracts, enable economies to grow and prosper because they can govern complex market 
transactions more efficiently than informal institutions, which includes the use of personal 
relationships that develop through close connections, ties, and prior experiences (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 1996). Transaction cost efficiency reinforces the evolutionary path of institutional 
change since parties create and endorse practices and institutions that enable greater 
administrative efficiency and thus lower transaction costs (Li, Park, and Li, 2003; Peng, 2003; 
Williamson, 1996).  
However, as alluded to in the opening quote, this view is strikingly at odds with the 
realities of institutional change because of political and cultural obstacles (Mahoney, 2005). As 
North (1990) argues, the inability to develop a court system that can enforce contracts is “the 
most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the 
third world” (see Mahoney, 2005: 122). Legal systems that enforce contract law do not 
automatically appear in emerging economies (North, 2005).  Beliefs of favoritism and 
unpredictability may continue to mark some legal jurisdictions and thereby dampen the integrity 
of the courts, which in turn undermines the use of contracts.  If formal legal institutions are 
unpredictable, managers may rely on informal, personal-based mechanisms to substitute the 
institutional void and coordinate exchanges (Peng, 2003; Xin and Pearce, 1996).  
In addition, traditions and customs may impede managers’ willingness to embrace new 
practices and institutions (North, 2005).  In particular, China’s cultural heritage of personal 
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connections and favors may not support the use of formal institutions, such as contract law and 
contracts (Boisot and Child, 1996; Child et al., 2003; Xin and Pearce, 1996). Prior research 
emphasizes the advantages of coordinating transactions through informal mechanisms, such as 
those based on personal relationships.  Because prior experiences form a credible basis to predict 
future behavior, perceptions of economic exchange risk decline (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; 
Xin and Pearce, 1996). Moreover, personal connections and ties foster stability and enhances 
bilateral coordination, especially in times of uncertainty (Keister, 2001; Zhou et al., 2003).  
These alternative perspectives illustrate a significant research gap: Whether and in what 
conditions do managers rely more on formal institutions (e.g., contracts) over informal 
institutions (e.g., personal relationships, trust) to safeguard transactions in emerging economies?  
Our empirical inquiry attempts to fill this gap by examining whether variations in perceptions of 
legal enforceability in China affect the use of contracts and relational reliability.1  We define 
relational reliability as beliefs that the other party involved in the market exchange will act in a 
non-opportunistic manner, such as not taking advantage of incomplete information, not profiting 
at the other’s expense, or being even handed in negotiations.  Whereas previous studies 
demonstrate the benefits of prior ties in emerging economies (e.g., Li et al., 2008; Peng and Luo, 
2000), they do not employ a comparative governance choice approach to examine whether 
managers match exchange hazards with their choice of relational reliability and contracts. 
Without a comparative assessment, the debated path and direction of institutional change for 
emerging economies remains unanswered. That is, if the court system is perceived as a credible 
(e.g., it will enforce contracts), will managers choose contracts over relational reliability to 
safeguard their transactions? In contrast, will a cultural heritage that supports doing business 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge Prof Alain Verbeke for the specific term of ‘relational reliability,’ commonly referred to as trust. 
Some researchers posit that relational reliability is a more meaningful and useful concept than the term ‘trust’ to 
characterize business relationships (Verbeke and Greidanus 2009; see also Williamson, 1996). 
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with personal relationships persist even when credible courts exist (Boisot and Child, 1996; 
Child et al., 2003)?   
A second research gap is on how legal enforceability affects the relationship between 
relational reliability and contracts.  While the governance choice perspectives outlined above 
view contracts and personal relationships (e.g. trust) as discrete structural choices, an alternative 
logic advances that contracts and such relational practices are related to one another (Doz, 1996; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Faems et al., 2008).  Unknown, however, is how legal enforceability 
affects this relationship.  A prevailing view for doing business in emerging economies is that 
transacting with known parties is a necessary precondition to more complex, risky exchanges and 
thus more explicit contracts (Boisot and Child, 1996; Zhou et al., 2003).  Based on the 
institutional logic (Peng, 2003), however, we extend that the effect of relational reliability on 
contracts may weaken as perceptions of legal enforceability increase:  an effective legal system 
may mitigate the need to rely on relational reliability as a vehicle for governing more complex 
contractual exchanges.  Related, others posit that contracts may function as a tangible sign for 
commitment which fosters trusting relationships (Woolthuis et al., 2005).  Extending this logic, 
we advance that the signaling value of contracts necessarily weakens under a regime of legal 
enforceability as contracts signal more about the efficacy of sanctions but less of trustworthiness.  
Taken together, our efforts enrich the development of institutional theory by examining 
whether a transaction cost logic characterizes governance choices in China and how legal 
enforceability influences the relationship between relational reliability and contracts. Figure 1 
depicts our conceptual model.  
 Insert Figure 1 about here.  
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
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Emerging economies typically are characterized by rapid economic development but also 
volatile changes in their social, legal, and economic institutions, which create serious strategic 
problems for firms (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In particular, concerns about property right 
protection, legitimate returns, and fair competition arise when adequate legal protection and law 
enforcement are lacking. For China, though economic reforms since 1979 clearly have 
transformed it toward a market-based economy, the “state-building” of market reform inevitably 
leads to a complicated, intertwined network between the government and the market. As a result, 
legal enforceability varies greatly from region to region and from industry to industry (Child and 
Mollering, 2003; Luo, 2007). 
Legal Reform in China 
In the past 30 years, China has developed a legal system to support its market-driven 
initiatives. Unlike other transitional economies such as Russia, China did not create a political 
vacuum by disrupting its socialistic political structure to create a market-based economy; instead, 
it retained a strong central government that has directed legal reforms. In particular, in 1981, the 
government created its first Economic Contract Law, which endorsed the formation and 
implementation of contracts (Lubman, 1999). Subsequent laws have addressed exchanges 
between domestic and foreign firms, as well as technology transfer and cooperation (Zhou et al., 
2003). In 1999, a new contract law took effect that provides a uniform legal framework for 
economic contracts.  
Legal Enforceability in China 
Despite continued institutional reform since 1979, the central government has not created 
a stable legal structure to enforce contract law throughout its provinces; enforcement is subject to 
particularism and personal accommodation due to (1) intervention from local or regional 
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government officials, (2) the lack of independent law enforcement, and (3) at times, frequent 
unjustified law changes (Luo, 2007). Officials may intervene in business operations in an 
inconsistent, arbitrary, or at times corrupt agenda (Child and Mollering, 2003). A local 
government official, for example, may decide to mandate an operational direction or position for 
a firm operating in its jurisdiction. If management chooses not to comply with the directive, the 
firm must pay a tax/fee to the local government that is greater than the value of the company. In 
effect, the local government can cause a firm to go bankrupt.2 Because of the involvement and 
power of government officials, it is not uncommon for some companies to designate a high-
ranking manager to function as a boundary spanner or to locate some operations in close 
proximity to the central government (Li et al., 2009).  
Case studies also describe the inconsistent enforcement of contract law and lack of 
property rights protection; in particular, political officials representing the local government 
often dismiss contract law when conflict arises and tend to accommodate the desires of 
companies with strong political connections (Li, 2004). Empirical work shows that Chinese 
businesses benefit from strong political ties with government officials, presumably because 
government officials personally accommodate their needs (Peng and Luo, 2000). Thus, the 
regional government, which is actively involved in the operational and strategic decisions of 
businesses in its jurisdiction (Luo, 2007), can undermine the integrity of the legal system. As a 
result, legal enforceability varies by regions and locations, which makes it a pivotal factor that 
affects business operations and governance. China thus serves as a rich context for examining 
how variations in legal enforceability influence the governance choices of contracts and 
relational reliability.  
                                                 
2 This example is based on the information the authors obtained from field interviews with senior managers in 
China. 
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CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Institutional theory indicates that the comparative efficacy of alternative governance 
choices depends on a broad set of interrelated factors, including the institutional environment 
that defines the rules and beliefs of socially acceptable economic behavior, the organizations and 
constituents that articulate and impose rules or norms of legitimate behavior, and the individuals 
with whom behavioral preferences originate (North, 1990; Williamson, 1996). Institutions 
“include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction” (North, 
1990: 4), which can be formal, such as rules, or informal, such as conventions or codes of 
conduct, and are influenced by organizations and their constituents.  
According to institutional economics, as markets develop, formal institutions based on 
law and contracts should supplant a traditional reliance on informal mechanisms, such as 
personal relationships or trust3. The logic behind this claim states that formal institutions provide 
a superior means to protect property rights and avoid the risks inherent in many market 
exchanges (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). Assuming a well-established legal system exists, 
transaction cost economics (TCE) then suggests that efficient governance choices result from 
matching governance structures, which vary in their effectiveness, with exchanges, which differ 
in their attributes (Williamson, 1996).  
Central to this logic is the notion that exchange hazards trigger the potential for increased 
transaction costs which undermines the efficiency of economic exchange.  More recently, 
Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) propose the concept of bounded reliability as a more complete set 
                                                 
3 There are a variety of informal governance mechanisms, such as reputation, bonds, network ties, professional 
pressures, etc. (Verbeke, 2003). This study focuses on relational reliability because it reflects the relational quality 
of informal mechanisms (Poppo, Zhou, and Ryu, 2008; Uzzi, 1997), is linked to trust, a focal governance 
mechanism for research on inter-organizational exchanges (Zaheer and Harris, 2005), and as such is theorized as an 
alternative or substitute to formal governance mechanisms (e.g. contracts, vertical integration) (see Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Peng, 2003).   
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of rationales underlying the transaction costs associated with coordination failures.  While 
Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) focus on coordination failures within the MNE, their framework 
readily applies to market failures: actors may exhibit ex post unreliable behavior and ‘break 
promises or agreements’ due to 1) opportunistic behavior, 2) an ex post preference reversal that 
leads one party to reprioritize terms or aspects of the agreement, and 3) an ex post preference 
reversal due to an overcommittment which means one party can no longer fulfill the original 
agreement.  Thus, a variety of situations could increase transaction costs, which may be 
intentionally opportunistic or not.  That is, Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) argue that 
‘benevolent’ preference reversals are not opportunistic ploys, but simply ex post adaptations 
triggered by reprioritizations or over commitments.   
According to Williamson (1996: 30), an obvious governance solution to situations that 
increase transaction costs is to write more explicit contracts that harmonize “the contractual 
interface that joins the parties, thereby to affect adaptability and promote continuity.” Explicit 
contracts refer to formal agreements that specify and detail the obligations of each party, such as 
their roles and responsibilities, performance expectations, monitoring procedures, and dispute 
resolution processes (Barthelemy and Quelin, 2006).  In doing so, contracts seek to control 
behavior by specifying a mutually agreed upon set of behaviors or activities and sanctions for 
non-compliance (Masten, 1993; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
An alternative function of contracts is coordination – the contract is a ‘technical aid’ for 
managing the exchange relationship (Carson, Madhok, and Wu, 2006; Woolthuis et al, 2005).  
For example, the contract may specify shared goals, delivery dates and information related to 
system interactions (Mayer and Argyres, 2004), specific coordination mechanisms such as 
steering committees, project groups, or face to face meetings (Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009), as 
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well as processes for resolving disputes, setting goals, and adapting exchanges to unforeseen 
contingencies (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  These coordination devices foster more frequent 
communication and a greater flow of information.  Such initiatives may also reduce preference 
reversals because when ‘commitments are kept top of the mind’, biases that lead to preference 
reordering are minimized (Verbeke and Greidanus,  2009).   
Explicit contracts may or may not be wholly complete. If the contract is complete in 
accordance with the classical view of contracts, it specifies obligations of the parties in different 
states of the world (Macneil, 1978; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).  However, as exchange hazards 
increase, contracts may become less complete because it is impossible to know all future states 
(Hart and Moore, 1999). In such situations, hazards trigger more incomplete contracts that 
explicate rules and processes for resolving disagreements and addressing unexpected events 
(Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Macneil, 1978). In general, transaction-based logic posits that 
exchange hazards promote the use of more explicit contracts. Because of the costs of writing, 
enforcing, and monitoring contracts, parties further specify contracts only when the risk is 
significant (Joskow, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
Legal Enforceability, Exchange Hazards, and Contracts 
TCE identifies three major types of exchange risks: asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty. Asset specificity refers to the specialized portion of 
investments that cannot be redeployed if the exchange relationship terminates prematurely 
(Williamson, 1996). It increases the risk of opportunistic behavior because one party may haggle 
or hold up the other to capture a larger portion of the quasi-rent associated with the specialized 
investment (Williamson, 1996). Similarly, it signals the risk associated with adapting the 
transaction should parties no longer choose to honor the agreement because their preferences 
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change over time (Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009);  that is, a supplier may not follow through on 
an agreement because poor planning lead to an over commitment of resources or an emergent 
conflict lead to a reordering of priorities. As asset specificity increases, more explicit contracts 
eliminate or attenuate costly bargaining over the profits earned from specialized assets (i.e. 
opportunism) and protect parties from the costs associated with preference reversals, such as the 
costs associated with pre-mature termination, scaled-back investments, or a significant drop in 
volume.  Consistent with this logic, Reurer and Arino (2007) find that contracts are more likely 
to contain explicit pre-termination, arbitration, and lawsuit provisions for more asset-specific 
transactions.  
Environmental uncertainty refers to unanticipated, unpredictable changes in 
circumstances surrounding an exchange. It challenges exchange coordination by creating the 
need to adapt operations and strategies in situations fraught with incomplete and asymmetric 
information (Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven, 2006).   Thus, uncertainty arising from 
bounded rationality can be a mitigating source of preference reversals and/or opportunistic 
behavior.  When the environment is highly uncertain, more explicit clauses facilitate adjustments 
as events unfold and avoid constant renegotiations (Masten, 1993). Related, formalizing roles 
and processes that support periodic joint planning sessions alleviates costs associated with 
preference reversals (Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009).  Empirically, Barthelemy and Quelin 
(2006) find that the greater the uncertainty about future needs, the more explicit the contract 
regarding contingencies, which fosters adaption of the exchanges given that level of uncertainty.  
Behavioral uncertainty occurs when one party cannot effectively monitor or measure the 
collective performance of the other. When performance is difficult to measure, parties have 
incentives to limit their efforts, because their partner cannot accurately measure and reward 
 12
productivity.  Alternatively, because of the lack of explicit information, parties cannot readily 
determine courses of actions should preference reversals occur (Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009).  
To mitigate these costs, parties draft more explicit contracts regarding non-performance, 
incentives, the roles and responsibilities of each party, and periodic monitoring or reviews 
(Krishnan et al., 2006).  
The preceding logic indicates that parties choose more explicit contracts as exchange 
hazards grow increasingly consequential. Critical to this logic is the assumption that the legal 
system enforces contracts effectively.  If laws are not enforced in a consistent manner but instead 
are subject to particular circumstances, legal institutions cannot create the necessary level of 
credibility, stability, and certainty to support the use of contracts (North, 1990; Peng, 2003).  At 
the firm level, Luo (2007) indicates two major sources that make managers perceive poor legal 
enforceability in China. First, less developed geographic areas generally have weaker legal 
systems, poorer legal services, and lower law enforceability, in which the local governments are 
more likely to interfere with companies’ operations. Second, political ties and connections with 
government officials play a pivotal role in China. When legal institutions lack predictability and 
can be readily influenced by managerial requests, firms with fewer political connections or ties 
are likely to be disadvantaged. As a result, managers with fewer connections with local judiciary 
and government authority will perceive a lower level of legal enforceability.  
For our purposes, strong (weak) perceived legal enforceability means that one party 
perceives that the court system can (cannot) protect their company’s financial interests when 
doing business with another company. Consistent with the institutional and TCE logics, we posit 
that weak legal protection significantly reduces a firm’s reliance on contracts to mitigate the risks 
of exchange hazards.  First, because a weak legal system provides little legal recourse for victims 
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of opportunistic conduct or for preference reversals that negate the original terms of the 
agreement, firms are unlikely to use contracts to safeguard their transaction-specific investments. 
When irresolvable differences exist and premature termination occurs, firms are not confident 
the courts will intercede to divide the assets in an equitable manner (Luo, 2007). Second, 
environmental uncertainty requires exchange partners to monitor changes and to adjust their 
strategies accordingly.  Such changes imply that the original terms of the agreement are modified 
to accommodate the change.  However the use of formal procedures to resolve changes or 
disputes in an equitable or timely fashion cannot be easily enforced with a weak legal system. 
For example, explicit contracts cannot guarantee the parties will disclose private information to 
facilitate equitable adjustments or periodically meet for joint activity planning to ease the costs 
associated with preference reversals.  Alternatively if exchange partners do not comply with the 
terms of the contract, companies cannot be certain that the courts will uphold sanctions against 
those misbehaviors (Child and Mollering, 2003).  Third, ineffective courts cannot enforce the use 
of contractually specified remedies for difficult performance measurement, such as the disclosure 
and audit of private information. Thus, when the legal system is weak, parties are unlikely to 
craft more explicit more explicit mechanisms to monitor or review the supplier’s actions and 
decisions.  In summary,  
H1a: The relationship between asset specificity and contract explicitness is stronger when 
perceived legal enforceability is high rather than low.  
H1b: The relationship between environmental uncertainty and contract explicitness is 
stronger when perceived legal enforceability is high rather than low.  
H1c: The relationship between behavioral uncertainty and contract explicitness is stronger 
when perceived legal enforceability is high rather than low.  
 
Legal Enforceability, Exchange Hazards, and Relational Reliability  
In interorganizational relationships, relational reliability prompts exchange parties to hold 
a collective, long-term orientation and to display a willingness to rely on and be vulnerable to the 
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other organization (Rousseau, Burt, and Camerer, 1998). As such, relational reliability operates 
as a governance mechanism that sanctions exchange behavior from opportunistic behavior.  For 
simple exchanges with low levels of exchange hazards, relational reliability is unnecessary 
because the risk of opportunism must be present to experience benefits from relational reliability 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Thus, matching risk and relational reliability can function as a 
preemptive strike against losses from opportunistic behavior, and managers increasingly rely on 
relational reliability to attenuate potential losses from opportunistic behavior (e.g. Anderson and 
Weitz, 1992; Bercovitz et al, 2006; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).   
The primary benefit of relational reliability is that parties know what to expect from the 
other; the party has an expectation for how the other will act in the future.  Prior relationships 
and interactions, a shadow of the past, creates a social institution capable of building relational 
reliability (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995). Through the accumulation of exchange-specific 
experiences a party develops an expectation of the other’s behavior or type (e.g. Larson, 1992; 
Zajac and Olsen, 1993).  Once developed the social-psychological bonds of norms, sentiments 
and friendships as well as the faith in the morality and goodwill of others reinforces and supports 
it use (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Uzzi, 1997).  More recent empirical work shows that the past 
plays a facilitating, albeit indirect role in producing relational reliability through its effect on a 
shadow of the future:  that is, expectations of future business figure more directly, and thus, 
prominently than a shadow of the past in determining relational reliability (Poppo, Zhou, and 
Ryu, 2008).  Thus, relational reliability is entrenched in social relationships with strong 
conventions and expectations of future interaction. 
While creating perceptions of intention, reliability, and trustworthiness occupies a 
historical past in China and coordinates business deals for thousands of years (Child and 
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Mollering, 2003; Xin and Pearce, 1996), we advance that perceptions of legal enforceability are 
likely to affect the use of relational reliability.  In particular, managers likely rely on relational 
reliability to safeguard their transactions when legal institutions are perceived as weak.  If legal 
enforcement is unreliable and third-party verification of information is not available, parties will 
not seek greater use of contracts because distrust of not only rules but also public information 
arises (Luo, 2007). Due to the lack of formal legal-supporting institutions, firms often resort to 
informal, trust-based relationships to substitute the institutional void, settle disputes, and protect 
their business needs (Boisot and Child, 1996; Li et al., 2008).  Armed with positive expectations 
about the other party’s reliability, predictability, and motives, parties have greater assurances that 
promises and agreements with be honored by both parties.  Thus, they are can rely on relational 
reliability to coordinate behavior within the economic exchange.   In addition since personal 
relationships enable the exchange of richer and more detailed information, trusted parties realize 
lower search costs and can make more informed decisions.  Thus, relational reliability facilitates 
coordination and adaptation of economic exchanges. 
Consistent with this position many advocate the use of prior personal experiences for 
transacting in emerging economies that lack strong legal systems.  Because prior experience 
forms a credible basis to predict future behavior, perceptions of economic exchange risk decline, 
so that for example, bank lenders are more likely to lend credit to reliable parties (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 1999; Xin and Pearce, 1996). When facing uncertainty or difficult performance 
measurement, companies turn to their trusted partners for timely information sharing and speedy 
coordination (Inkpen and Currall, 2004).  Related, with relational reliability, parties act as if the 
expected value of the exchange were stable, even in the presence of uncertainty (Zajac and 
Olsen, 1993).  Thus, parties choose to forgo opportunistic behaviors, they forbear, and mutual 
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forbearance becomes a defining feature of their successful interorganizational exchanges (Inkpen 
and Currall, 2004). Less accepted in extant literature is whether trusting beliefs safeguard parties 
from the risks associated with unrecoverable investments or specialized assets (Inkpen and 
Currall, 2004). Some researchers argue that investments in specialized assets signal 
trustworthiness (Anderson and Weitz, 1992), but others claim transaction-specific investment 
may impede the development of trust-based governance (Sheng et al., 2006).  
However, if managers believe that the courts will enforce contracts, it is no longer 
obvious that managers should rely as much on relational reliability to safeguard exchanges.  As 
formal governance institutions become effective and legitimate, managers may not seek informal 
mechanisms because it is costly to establish and then maintain personal connections through 
frequent interactions (North, 1990; Peng, 2003).  Courts also decrease the need for personalized 
relationships because as institutions they enable a more reliable, predictable system to enforce 
the terms of the agreement and assure conflict is resolved in an equitable fashion (Zucker, 1986; 
Suchman, 1995).   For example, should dispute or changes arise and parties have different 
perceptions of fairness or equity or the intent of the transaction (Arino and Torre, 1998; Husted 
and Folger, 2004) trusting beliefs cannot provide assurance that each party gets paid or gets paid 
a ‘fair’ share given the incurred costs.  Empirical work further shows that even when trusting 
beliefs exist, parties appear to shirk some when it benefits them to do so, such as when one party 
cannot effectively monitor the other or when one party has invested in specialized assets (Poppo 
et al., 2008).  Related, expectations of cooperation can be associated with lower realized levels of 
cooperative behavior and this gap is associated with lower performance (Bercovitz et al., 2006). 
Thus, relational reliability may be an inherently less reliable enforcement mechanism than 
contracts.        
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Based on this logic, we advance that whereas relational reliability can safeguard market 
transactions from exchange hazards, parties may favor explicit contracts over it when they 
perceive legal enforceability as high. That is, as economic risk increases as a function of asset 
specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty, parties choose to draft more 
explicit contracts because legal enforcement offers greater assurance than relational reliability.  
Thus, as legal enforceability increases, it should weaken the association between exchange 
hazards and relational reliability. This decreased reliance on relational reliability, coupled with 
an increased reliance on explicit contracts (H1a–c), suggests how the enforceability of the legal 
system might affect governance preferences. Therefore, 
H2a: The relationship between asset specificity and relational reliability is weaker when 
perceived legal enforceability is high rather than low.  
H2b: The relationship between environmental uncertainty and relational reliability is 
weaker when perceived legal enforceability is high rather than low.  
H2c: The relationship between behavioral uncertainty and relational reliability is weaker 
when perceived legal enforceability is high rather than low.  
 
Legal Enforceability, Contracts, and Relational Reliability 
Well-accepted in the literature is the plural use of governance mechanisms (Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989; Dyer and Singh, 1998); that is, for many exchanges formal and informal 
mechanisms co-exist.  Less explored in this literature however is how structures and 
relationships may impact one another (Doz, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Faems et al., 2008).  
Whereas some works suggest that contracts facilitate trust-building (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), 
other studies posit the opposite (Malhortra and Murnighan, 2002).  Recent work suggests that to 
resolve inconsistencies, further specification of contingencies is necessary (Woolthuis et al., 
2005; Faems et. al., 2008).  We join this effort by examining a new angle:  how broader 
institutions, such as a credible legal system, may influence the relationship between relational 
reliability and contracts.  In particular, we examine as legal enforceability in China increases, 1) 
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does relational reliability play a less pivotal role in supporting the use of contracts, and 2) does 
the signaling value of contracts, as a sign of commitment and trustworthiness, decline?  
A prevailing view for doing business in emerging economies is that personal connections 
are a necessary precondition to more complex, risky exchanges (Boisot and Child, 1996; Keister, 
2001).  Consistent with this logic, Zhou et al. (2003) observe that partners meeting for the first 
time tend to rely on informal contracts to initiate their business transactions in China; only after 
time has passed and knowledge of the other is garnered through experience do parties develop 
more formal contractual provisions to coordinate exchanges. Our field interviews with a senior 
purchasing manager confirm the point that prior experience supports the use of contracts: 
It is impossible to sign a contract with someone you do not know well. First, who knows whether 
he/she can fulfill the contract? Second, if he/she misbehaved, how would you reinforce the 
contract? It is just too difficult to rely on the court to do so. So a common practice is to do 
business with someone you know well, and over time then you can draft more specialized 
contract for more complicated transactions.  
 
 Yet, according to the institutional perspective, one of the benefits of a credible legal 
system is that parties can substitute formal mechanisms for informal governance (e.g. North, 
1990; Peng, 2003).  That is, with stronger perceptions of legal enforceability, managers may no 
longer seek prior experience with an exchange partner to support their use of more explicit 
contracts.  As argued in H2, personal relations may be an inherently less reliable and more costly 
enforcement mechanism.  Moreover, prior experience may be less necessary because more 
explicit contracts can structure coordination, resulting in greater bilateral interaction and 
decision-making.  As a result, contracts can effectively ease coordination problems that arise 
from benevolent preferences, such as reprioritization or over commitment (Verbeke and 
Greidanus, 2009).  Thus, armed with greater legal enforceability, parties may be less likely to 
rely on relational reliability as a vehicle for supporting the use of more explicit contracts.   
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H3a: The effect of relational reliability on contract explicitness is weaker when perceived 
legal enforceability is high rather than low.  
 
An alternative view is whether contracts support the development of personal 
relationships.  We advance that when legal enforceability is low, contracts may support the use 
of relational reliability because it helps inform a central problem in exchange:  discerning 
another’s motives when one is uncertain or ignorant of the other’s likely behavior.  That is, 
selecting a business partner who is likely to honor the business agreement, which is particularly 
difficult in the relative absence of a credible legal system.  In this context, the contract may 
represent a tangible sign of commitment:  the expression and intention to be a trustworthy or 
reliable partner (Woolthius et al., 2005; Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001).  Since the contract 
essentially represents a costly-to-develop, bilateral agreement structuring coordination, 
outcomes, and sanctions, it is not likely to be a false signal, if undertaken.  That is, if parties 
choose to cheat another, they risk the cost of contract development as well as having a reputation 
for being dishonest.  A second benefit of contracts which may foster the development of a 
reliable relationship is formalization:  when the contract contains an explicit structure for 
behavior, it promotes the expectation that the other party will behave cooperatively, which not 
only fosters reliability but also complements one of the known limits of personal exchange, 
namely, the lack of formal rules and expectations (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  As recent work 
shows, a flexible application and broad form of contract formalization is more likely to be 
associated with trust-building (Faems et al., 2008). 
Yet, we advance that the signaling value of contracts may decline as legal enforceability 
improves. When legal enforceability is strong, the commitment signal of contracts is noisier:  the 
contract may still signal the intention to honor the agreement, but it also signals a reliance on 
formal means to produce cooperation.  That is, as a legally binding document, it is a sign of 
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coercion and sanctions that is meant to protect both parties should irreconcilable differences 
occur.  Thus, we argue that under a regime of legal enforceability, a contract signals more about 
the efficacy of sanctions but less regarding trustworthiness.  
H3b: The effect of contract explicitness on relational reliability is weaker when perceived 
legal enforceability is high rather than low. 
 
METHOD 
 
Sampling and Data Collection 
To test the hypotheses, we examine buyer–supplier relationships of manufacturing firms 
located in two major regions (Beijing and Shanghai) in China in 2004. Both Beijing and 
Shanghai are administratively equal to a province (i.e., state). Shanghai, which is slightly larger 
than Delaware, consists of 19 county-level divisions. Nine of these divisions constitute urban 
Shanghai, where prominent central business districts are located. The other 10 divisions are 
mostly suburbs, satellite towns, and rural areas. Beijing, which is comparable in size to New 
Jersey, contains 8 urban divisions and 10 suburban and rural divisions. All the central business 
districts are located in urban areas. 
To learn about the institutional factors and context, we conducted field interviews with 
ten managers, asking them a series of open-ended questions regarding the role of the 
government, legal enforceability, contracts, and relational reliability. Our field interviews 
revealed that urban areas, especially central business districts in these two regions, are 
characterized by a relatively well-developed legal system and services, whereas other districts, 
especially rural areas, lack consistent enforcement of contract law and property rights. Therefore, 
Beijing and Shanghai provide significant variation in legal enforceability, which enables us to 
examine its effects on governance choices in an emerging economy.  
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To collect data, we collaborated with local researchers and trained interviewers to 
administer the survey during onsite personal meetings, the method of choice to obtain reliable 
and valid information in emerging economies (Zhou, Tse, and Li, 2006). Our survey was first 
developed in English and then, with the assistance of independent translators, translated into 
Chinese, and finally translated back to English to ensure conceptual equivalence (Hoskisson et 
al., 2000). To ensure the content and face validity of the measures, we conducted five in-depth 
interviews with senior purchasing managers and asked each respondent to verify the relevance 
and completeness of the measures. On the basis of their responses, we revised a few 
questionnaire items to enhance their clarity. We then conducted a pilot study with 40 purchasing 
professionals who not only answered all the items but also provided their feedback about the 
design and wording of the questionnaire. We finalized the questionnaire according to the results 
of the pilot study.  
A sample of 1,000 firms was randomly selected from a list of all manufacturing firms 
located in the two areas that operated within the four-digit Chinese Industrial Classification 
(CIC) codes 1311–4290, which are similar to Standard Industrial Classification codes (but with 
slight variations). These firms span diverse industries (e.g., mechanics, materials, chemicals, 
plastics, electronics, computer equipment, apparel, furniture, and food). In each firm, a senior 
purchasing manager serves as the key informant because our interviews revealed that these 
managers would be most knowledgeable about relationships with suppliers.  
Managers were first contacted by telephone to solicit their cooperation. To motivate their 
participation, the interviewers informed them of the academic nature of the study and the 
confidentiality of their responses, and then offered an incentive in the form of a summary report. 
A total of 476 managers from different firms agreed to participate, of whom 403 were 
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successfully interviewed onsite. Informants selected one of their firm’s major suppliers and 
answered the survey questions regarding their exchanges with that supplier. After eliminating 
four surveys with missing data, we obtained 399 complete responses, representing an effective 
response rate of 39.9% (399 of 1,000 firms). The majority of the firms (64.1%) had 100–1,000 
employees, and 65.4% had annual sales revenues of more than US$3 million. In addition, 57.7% 
were Chinese firms (9.0% state-owned, 35.8% private, and 12.9% stock or public-listed 
companies), whereas 42.3% were foreign-owned firms (23.3%) or joint ventures (20.3%). On 
average, respondents had been working for 10.9 years in the industry and 6.2 years with their 
company.  
After the fieldwork, one of the authors randomly called 40 respondents to confirm that 
the interviews had been conducted and found no cheating in the fieldwork. A comparison 
between the responding and nonresponding firms using MANOVA indicates no significant 
differences in terms of key firm characteristics (i.e., industry type, firm ownership, number of 
employees, and annual sales revenues) (Wilks’  = .957; F = 1.423; p = .658), which suggests 
nonresponse bias is not a concern in our study. To validate our key informant approach, we used 
Podsakoff and Organ’s (1986) post-hoc technique to select 40 firms randomly from among those 
participating in the 2004 survey and conducted onsite interviews in 2005 with two purchasing 
managers or directors from each firm. Of the two managers, one had participated in the 2004 
survey and the other was a new informant. We successfully obtained responses from 64 
managers from 32 firms. The test–retest reliability of the same managers’ responses in 2004 and 
2005 ranged from .99 (exchange duration) to .76 (environmental uncertainty) (all p < .001), and 
the interrater reliability between the two managers’ responses in 2005 ranged from .98 
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(transaction frequency) to .80 (asset specificity) (all p < .001). These results demonstrate the 
validity of our key informant approach. 
Measures 
The measures used in the survey are adapted from established studies. The measurement 
items and validity assessment appear in the Appendix.  
Exchange hazards. We examine three types of hazards: asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty. Our measure of asset specificity comes from Cannon and 
Perreault (1999) and captures buyers’ specific investments in product features, personnel, 
inventory and distribution, marketing, and capital equipment and tools to accommodate 
suppliers’ needs. We also adapt a measure of environmental uncertainty from Cannon and 
Perreault (1999) to examine the environmental changes in the supply market with respect to 
pricing, product features and specifications, vendor support services, technology, and product 
supply. On the basis of Brown, Dev, and Lee’s (2000) and Poppo and Zenger’s (2002) work, we 
develop a measure of behavioral uncertainty that assesses the difficulty of evaluating the 
performance of the other party.  
Governance. We focus on two types of governance structures: relational reliability and 
explicit contracts. We adapt the measure of relational reliability from Zaheer et al. (1998) to 
examine the predictability, opportunistic intent, and fairness of the exchange partner. The 
measure of explicit contracts comes from Lusch and Brown (1996) and examines the degree to 
which the contract specifies and details the roles and responsibilities of each party, how each 
party is to perform, and how to deal with unexpected events.  
Legal enforceability. We adapt the measure of perceived legal enforceability from Child 
et al. (2003). Our items measure the degree to which the legal system can protect the firms’ 
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business interests, including their financial obligations (e.g., payments from the other party, 
recouping financial interests).  
Controls. We control for four sources of heterogeneity. First, we consider the transaction 
characteristic of duration. Exchange duration is a well-established antecedent of relational 
reliability through the accumulation of experiences over time (Poppo, Zhou, and Ryu, 2008). We 
measure it as the logarithm of years the firm has been doing business with its supplier.  
Second, because of the variation in the institutions that characterize emerging markets 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000), we control for the effects of foreign ownership and business group 
affiliation. Foreign firms are accustomed to using contracts, and we suspect that foreign and 
domestic firms use contracts differently. We code foreign ownership as a dummy variable, with 
1 = international joint ventures or foreign firms and 0 = otherwise. Previous research also 
indicates that business group membership offers legitimacy and protection from unknown 
suppliers (Keister, 2001). Thus, we suspect that transactions within a business groups are more 
inclined to develop relational reliability. Following Keister (2001), we code it as a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 when the buyer and supplier belong to the same business group, and 0 
otherwise. 
Third, we control for firm size and industry, which may be important exogenous factors 
that affect governance decisions (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). We use the logarithm of the number 
of employees in the company to indicate firm size. For industry, we use three dummy variables 
to control for the differences in the primary industry in which the firm operates: mechanics, 
heavy (i.e., chemicals, materials, automobile), and electronics. The remaining industries (i.e., 
consumer products such as apparel, furniture, and food) represent the baseline group. 
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Fourth, we control for firm location and political ties because they likely affect managers’ 
perceptions of legal enforceability. We measure firm location as a dummy variable where 1 = 
urban location and 0 = others (i.e., suburbs, towns, and rural areas). Political ties is measured 
with one seven-point indicator: In the past three years, the government and its agencies have 
provided significant support to our firm (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  
Common method assessment. Because information about the dependent and 
independent variables comes from the same respondent, we recognize the potential for common 
method bias. We therefore run a Harman one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986), which 
loads all the perceptual items into an exploratory factor analysis. Common method bias is a 
concern if a single factor emerges from the factor analysis or factor 1 accounts for the majority 
of the variance. The factor analysis of all measurement items results in a solution that accounts 
for 70.86% of the total variance, in which factor 1 accounts for 16.97%. Because a single factor 
does not emerge and factor 1 does not explain most of the variance, common method bias is 
unlikely to be a concern in our data.  
Construct validity. We refine the multiple-item measures and assess their construct 
validity following the guidelines suggested by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). First, we run 
exploratory factor analyses for each of the multiple-item variables, which results in factor 
solutions as theoretically expected. Reliability analyses further show that these measures possess 
satisfactory coefficient reliability. Second, we run confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with 
AMOS 6.0 for an overall six-factor model with all the variables included. The Appendix reports 
the results of this CFA, including the goodness-of-fit index, factor loadings, and composite 
reliability.  
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Because the chi-square test is sensitive to sample size, we rely on the goodness-of-fit 
index (GFI), comparative fit index (CFI), incremental fit index (IFI), and root mean squared 
error of approximation (RMSEA) to evaluate the model fit (Bollen, 1989). As the Appendix 
shows, all the fit indexes are equal to or above the .90 benchmark (GFI = .92, CFI = .96, IFI = 
.96), and the RMSEA is less than .05 (.049, p(close fit) = .61); therefore, the model fits the data 
satisfactorily (Bollen, 1989; Hu and Bentler, 1999). Furthermore, the composite reliabilities of 
all constructs range from .859 to .938, well above the usual .70 benchmark. The average variance 
extracted for every construct is higher than the .50 cutoff (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Thus, these 
measures demonstrate satisfactory convergent validity.  
We assess the discriminant validity of the measures in two ways. First, we run pairwise 
chi-square difference tests for all multiple-item scales to determine whether the restricted model 
(correlation fixed at 1.0) fits the data significantly worse than the freely estimated model 
(correlation estimated freely). All the chi-square differences are highly significant (e.g., asset 
specificity vs. environmental uncertainty: 2 (1) = 747.366, p = .000), in support of 
discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Second, we perform a more stringent test to 
determine whether the average variance extracted for each construct is greater than its highest 
shared variance with other constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The results show that for each 
construct, the average variance extracted is much higher than its highest shared variance with 
other constructs, in additional support of discriminant validity (see the Appendix). Overall, these 
results show that our measures possess satisfactory reliability and validity.  
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the constructs.  As 
Table 1 shows, perceived legal enforceability relates positively to urban location and political 
ties, supporting the logic that location and political connection are two significant sources of 
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variations in managers’ perception of legal enforceability (Luo, 2007). Moreover, 48% firms are 
located in urban areas and 52% are in other areas, showing a relatively equal representation of 
locations with low vs. high legal enforceability. 
 Insert Table 1 about here.  
  
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Because our model contains a bidirectional link between relational reliability and 
contracts, a non-recursive model is appropriate for estimating the relationships simultaneously 
(Bollen, 1989). We estimate a model with structural equation modeling (SEM) that contains a 
link from relational reliability to contract, as well as a link from contract to relational reliability. 
With this non-recursive model, we must treat some controls as instrumental variables; otherwise 
the model would be overidentified and could not be estimated. We link exchange duration to 
relational reliability, foreign ownership to contract, and others to both relational reliability and 
contract. Our model also contains interaction effects. The resultant challenge associated with 
running SEM with interaction terms pertains to how to manage the model complexity created by 
the large number of interaction items. To keep the model parsimonious, we adopt Ping’s (1995) 
method to calculate the interaction indicators. We summarize the estimation results in Table 2.  
 Insert Table 2 about here.  
 
H1 examines whether legal enforceability (LE) positively moderates the relationships 
between explicit contracts and (a) asset specificity (AS), (b) environmental uncertainty (EU), and 
(c) behavioral uncertainty (BU). As Table 2 shows, the interaction terms AS  LE, EU  LE, and 
BU  LE all have significant and positive effects on explicit contracts (b = .22, p < .01; b = .13, p 
< .05; and b = .13, p < .05, respectively), in support of H1a, H1b, and H1c.  
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To gain more insight into the interaction effects, we follow the procedure proposed by 
Aiken and West (1991) to decompose the interactive terms. Specifically, we conduct simple 
slope tests and plot the relationships in Figure 2. For H1a, we split the legal enforceability 
variable into two groups—low (one standard deviation below the mean) and high (one standard 
deviation above the mean)—and estimate the effect of asset specificity on contracts for both 
levels. As we show in Figure 2, when legal enforceability is low, asset specificity relates 
negatively to explicit contracts (b = -.42, p < .01); when legal enforceability is high, asset 
specificity is positively associated with contracts (b = .13, p < .05). Similarly, we decompose the 
interaction for H1b and H1c. When legal enforceability is low, both environmental uncertainty (b 
= -.16, p < .01) and behavioral uncertainty (b = -.14, p < .05) negatively influence contracts. 
However, when legal enforceability is high, both environmental uncertainty (b = .16, p < .01) 
and behavioral uncertainty (b = .14, p < .05) have positive effects on contracts. These results 
suggest that when legal enforceability improves from low to high levels, the relationships 
between explicit contracts and exchange hazards change from negative to positive. In other 
words, managers are not inclined to draft more explicit contracts in response to exchange hazards 
when legal enforceability is weak; when legal enforceability is strong, they favor more explicit 
contracts to safeguard their transaction from exchange hazards.  
 Insert Figure 2 about here.  
 
H2 assesses whether legal enforceability negatively moderates the relationships between 
exchange hazards and relational reliability. Table 2 shows that the interaction terms of asset 
specificity and legal enforceability and of environmental uncertainty and legal enforceability 
have significant and negative effects on relational reliability (b = -.17, p < .01 and b = -.15, p < 
.01, respectively), in support of H2a and H2b. However, the interaction of behavioral uncertainty 
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and legal enforceability relates positively to relational reliability (b = .11, p <.05), in the opposite 
direction as predicted in H2c.  
Similarly, we decompose the interaction effects of H2 and plot the relationships in Figure 
2. As Figure 2 shows, when legal enforceability is low, asset specificity is positively associated 
with relational reliability (b = .20, p < .01); but when legal enforceability is high, asset 
specificity relates negatively to relational reliability (b = -.20, p < .01). Moreover, environmental 
uncertainty is positively associated with relational reliability when legal enforceability is low (b 
= .35, p < .01) but has no significant relationship with relational reliability when legal 
enforceability is high (b = .03, p > .10). Finally, behavioral uncertainty relates negatively to 
relational reliability when legal enforceability is low (b = -.28, p < .01) but has no significant 
relationship when legal enforceability is high (b = -.05, p > .10). These results suggest that when 
legal enforceability is weak, managers are more likely to match high levels of asset specificity 
and environmental uncertainty with relational reliability; alternatively, when legal enforceability 
is strong, managers are less likely to rely on relational reliability to safeguard their transactions 
from the hazards that can arise from asset specificity and environmental uncertainty. However, 
for behavioral uncertainty, the results show that managers do not choose relational reliability to 
safeguard against this risk, even when legal enforceability is low.  
In H3a, we examine whether legal enforceability moderates the effect of relational 
reliability on contract. Consistent with the notion that relational reliability is precondition of 
signing a contract in China, we find that relational reliability positively affects contract 
explicitness (b = .25, p < .01). However, legal enforceability does not moderate this effect (b = 
.06, p > .10), showing no support to H3a. The effect of relational reliability on contracts appears 
robust to whether legal enforceability is strong or weak. 
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With H3b, we assess whether legal enforceability moderates the effect of contracts on 
relational reliability. We find that explicit contracts positively influence relational reliability (b = 
.14, p < .05) and legal enforceability negatively moderates this effect (b = -.14, p < .05), which 
suggests that as legal enforceability improves, the effect of explicit contracts on relational 
reliability declines. We also decompose this moderating effect and graph it in Figure 2. The 
results show that when legal enforceability is low, explicit contracts positively affect relational 
reliability (b = .34, p < .01), whereas when legal enforceability is high, explicit contracts do not 
significantly influence relational reliability (b = .02, p > .10).  
Effects of Controls. Consistent with the time-dependence of relational reliability, 
exchange duration (i.e., prior ties) has a positive effect on relational reliability. Foreign firms, 
including foreign wholly-owned and international joint ventures, use more explicit contracts than 
local firms. We further find that if the buyer and supplier belong to the same business group, 
they are more likely to use relational reliability to coordinate exchanges. In addition, heavy 
industries (i.e., materials, chemicals, automobiles) use more explicit contracts.   
Post-hoc Analysis. In this study we view relational reliability as an informal governance 
mechanism. That is, it is based on prior social relationships and informal expectations regarding 
continuance (i.e. future exchange) (Poppo, Zhou, and Ryu, 2008).  Prior work also suggests that 
reputation bonds exist within business group, which may generate trusting perceptions (Keister, 
2001; Verbeke, 2003). Therefore, we run additional analysis to regress relational reliability 
against exchange duration (years the firm has been doing business with its supplier), 
socialization (‘our company and this supplier often visit each other’), exchange continuity (‘we 
expect this supplier to be working with us for a long time’), and business group affiliation 
(whether the company and the supplier belong to the same business group). The results show that 
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relational reliability is positively related to all these four factors, namely duration (b = .08, p < 
.05), socialization (b = .24, p < .01), exchange continuity (b = .36, p < .01), and business group 
affiliation (b = .15, p < .01).   
DISCUSSION  
The way in which the development of credible formal institutions affects business 
practice remains debatable because politics and culture may thwart attempts to induce change 
(Mahoney, 2005; North, 2005; Peng, 2003). This study represents the first attempt, to our 
knowledge, to inform this debate through an empirical snapshot of how variation in perceptions 
of legal enforceability affects the governance choices of relational reliability or contracts. Our 
results show that legal enforceability affects the governance choices of relational reliability and 
contracts in a manner consistent with the governance choice logic of TCE.  
In particular, when perceptions of legal enforceability are strong, managers are more 
likely to draft more explicit contracts and less likely to use relational reliability to safeguard their 
exchanges from transaction risks (i.e., asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and 
behavioral uncertainty).  In contrast, when legal enforceability is low, managers are less likely to 
use explicit contracts and more likely to rely on relational reliability to safeguard their exchanges 
with high asset specificity and environmental uncertainty. These findings suggest: 1) when legal 
enforceability is low, relational reliability appears to be the preferred governance choice for 
some conditions (asset specificity, environmental uncertainty); and 2) when legal enforceability 
is high, contracts are a preferred governance mechanism to safeguard transactions from 
economic risks. 
One surprising finding is that managers do not choose relational reliability in response to 
behavioral uncertainty that arises from the difficulty or inability to observe or monitor their 
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partner’s actions and decisions (see Figure 2, H2c). In theory, relational reliability should be 
important when situations of distrust exist (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). That is, relational 
reliability purportedly reduces self-interested actions that otherwise would occur when 
behavioral uncertainty exists (Krishnan et al., 2006). Yet our findings suggest that relational 
reliability is not a desirable choice to handle behavioral uncertainty, regardless of whether strong 
or weak legal enforceability exists. It may be that the Chinese are highly risk averse in situations 
in which they cannot monitor or formally evaluate the other (Zhou, Su, and Bao, 2002); in a 
related sense, this result may suggest that if one party can get away with cheating, it will, and 
relational reliability does not sanction this behavior. Consistent with recent inquiries (Carson et 
al., 2006; Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009), this finding cautions the unqualified enthusiasm of 
using relational reliability to coordinate exchange. Possibly, vertical integration may be 
necessary to handle behavior uncertainty when legal enforceability is low. 
Overall, these results endorse the logic that as emerging economies progress, firms rely 
more on formal contracts than personal relationships with partners to safeguard risky market 
transactions (North, 1990; Peng, 2003).  More generally, our findings indicate that legal 
enforceability plays a pivotal role in governance choices in emerging economies. Therefore, our 
first major contribution is the enrichment of institutional theory by demonstrating that a credible 
legal system shapes the choices of governance choices of contracts and relational reliability in 
the emerging economy of China.  
A second contribution of this research is our extension of extant literature regarding the 
relationship between contracts and relational reliability.  A substitution perspective posits that 
relational reliability and contracts are incompatible control devices:  the use of relational 
reliability supplants the need for contracts, because prior experiences and joint expectations can 
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readily support economic exchanges without the added costs of negotiating and amending 
detailed contracts (Adler, 2001; Dyer and Singh, 1998).  In contrast, other researchers suggest a 
complementary relationship between relational norms and contracts (Luo, 2002; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002).  We propose that legal enforceability may affect these relationships. Contrary to 
our proposed logic, we find no support that legal enforceability moderates the effect of relational 
reliability on contracts.  This nonsignificant result reinforces the prevailing view that prior 
experience with the trading party functions as a precondition of explicit contracts in China (Zhou 
et al., 2003).   Yet, consistent with our proposed logic, we find that legal enforceability 
moderates that relationship between contracts and relational reliability.  In particular, the effect 
of contracts on relational reliability declines as legal enforceability increases.  We advance that 
because the contract is viewed as a legally binding document in conditions of greater legal 
enforceability, it carries a sign of coercion and sanctions.  Thus, it signals less regarding 
trustworthiness in this context, and more about the efficacy of sanctions.  Yet, when legal 
enforceability is weak, the contract is a stronger signal of motives and commitment, and as such 
fosters greater relationship development (e.g. relational reliability).    
Managerial Implications 
Our findings also provide important implications for managers regarding the use of 
contracts and the selection of trading partners in China. Companies operating overseas must 
gather local information to understand how cultural and political institutions shape business 
transactions. Our findings highlight the importance of perceived enforceability of the local legal 
system, which is affected by firm locations as well as political ties. If firms attempt to obtain 
strong protection from the court system, they may want to locate in city areas and build 
connections with government officials. With strong legal enforceability, firms can rely on 
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contracts to protect their exchanges characterized by high levels of specialized assets, 
environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty. Managers should also consider how to 
specify contracts that foster continued interaction and awareness of commitments; when 
‘commitments are kept top of the mind,’ biases that lead to preference reordering are minimized 
(Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009).   
When legal enforceability is weaker, firms need to build more personal relationships to 
coordinate their exchanges. However, our work suggests that personal relationships do not 
enable managers to overcome the risk associated with behavioral uncertainty:  the difficulty of 
monitoring or observing another firm’s actions and decision. Instead, contracts, given strong 
legal enforceability, are a better safeguard against such risk. Finally, and not surprisingly, our 
results confirm the importance of establishing relationships with exchange partners.  Prior 
experience is often characterized as an important lubricant for social exchange. In China, 
transacting with a known party appears to provide a variety of positive functions: a safeguard 
against economic and market risks when effective courts do not exist, and a mechanism that 
encourages exchanges to go with greater contractual details and specifications.  
Limitations and Further Research 
Our study represents an initial effort to examine a complex phenomenon, which implies 
that further research clearly is necessary. First, our model does not examine the costs and 
benefits associated with relational reliability and contracts. Further work should consider 
whether governance preferences are consistent with the outcomes and costs of these choices.  
Second, recent research suggests that contracts involve two aspects, control and 
coordination (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Reurer and Arino, 2007; Faems et al., 2008). For 
example, Reurer and Arino (2007) find that the contracts among parties that represent prior ties 
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are less likely to contain coordination provisions, yet they still retain control provisions. 
Although our results suggest that relational reliability increases contract explicitness, we do not 
examine how the coordination and control aspects of contracts may vary as a function of 
relational reliability and legal enforceability.  
Third, we only consider relational reliability as the informal governance. Our ad hoc 
analyses show that consistent with prior literature, relational reliability is positively related prior 
exchange duration, socialization practices, expectation of future exchange, and business group 
affiliation.  Further research could uncover the roles of specific informal mechanisms, such as 
reputation bonds, network ties, and professional sanctions. Other formal mechanisms such as 
vertical integration and hybrid organization need additional attention. For example, further work 
may examine the make-or-buy decision as it may be advisable for firms to vertically integrate 
production to augment specialization or to minimize transaction costs arising from 
unobservability.  Related, how to model and measure the concept of bounded reliability 
represents a fruitful area for further research.  
Fourth, our cross-sectional design offers only a snapshot of how legal enforceability 
affects governance choice. To document institutional changes in governance choices, a 
longitudinal design is necessary. A longitudinal design also could tackle the causal links between 
informal and formal mechanisms and their contemporary evolutions. Fifth, our findings are 
limited to business transactions in two Chinese provinces. Although China shares many 
characteristics with other emerging economies, its unique cultural and political institutions likely 
possess some idiosyncrasies that may limit the generalizability of the findings. Additional 
research should assess whether legal enforceability is sufficient to change governance choices. 
Japan, for example, would be a highly interesting context because its legal system is well 
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established, quasi-integration is common, and trust is heavily used—yet debate continues about 
whether the Japanese choose to litigate ( Ginsburg and Hoetker, 2006; Visser ‘T Hooft, 2002). 
 As the global economy defines the boundaries of many firms, understanding how to 
structure exchanges in emerging markets or, alternatively, clarifying the impact of institutions on 
governance choice are important research queries. Because the underlying political, social, and 
legal institutions in emerging economies are often complex, idiosyncratic, and dynamic, the 
impact of such institutions on governance decisions remains relatively underexplored. Our study 
informs this topic by showing how legal institutions interact with exchange hazards to affect the 
choice of contracts and relational reliability in China. We hope that further research continues to 
explore and document institutional changes, governance choices, and their performance 
implications in emerging economies.  
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TABLE 1  
Basic Descriptive Statistics of the Constructs 
      
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Asset specificity 1.00               
2. Environmental  
    uncertainty  .32** 1.00              
3. Behavioral uncertainty  .17**  .27** 1.00             
4. Legal enforceability  .16**  .08  .08 1.00            
5. Relational reliability  .08  .10* -.29**  .15** 1.00           
6. Explicit contracts -.12*  .01 -.04  .18**  .24** 1.00          
7. Exchange duration  .05 -.03 -.26**  .10*  .31**  .08 1.00         
8. Foreign ownership -.06  .01 -.06  .07  .16**  .14**  .04 1.00        
9. Business group  .17**  .05 -.25**  .11*  .41** -.06  .36**  .21** 1.00       
10. Firm size  .01  .09 -.11*  .01  .02  .03  .13**  .12*  .10* 1.00      
11. Mechanics  .03 -.01  .12* -.14* -.04 -.08  .01  .04 -.01 -.03 1.00     
12. Heavy  .02 -.06 -.09 -.02  .08  .12*  .01 -.04  .08 -.04 -.33** 1.00    
13. Electronics  .05  .07  .01  .11*  .03  .03 -.03  .15**  .00  .21** -.24** -.22** 1.00   
14. Urban location -.07 -.03  .04  .12* -.08 -.03 -.13**  .13** -.06 -.03  .00 -.16**  .17** 1.00  
15. Political ties  .34**  .11*  .26**  .37**  .09 -.02  .09  .04  .13** -.06  .08 -.03 -.04 -.06 1.00 
     
Mean 3.19 3.91 3.84 4.39 4.94 5.08 1.43  .42  .39 5.20 .27 .23 .14 .48 3.94 
S.D. 1.39 1.09 1.28 1.26 1.07 1.19  .56  .49  .49  .99 .44 .42 .35 .50 1.45 
                
Notes: n = 399. 
** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed).  
 
 
 44
TABLE 2  
Standardized Estimates (t-value) of Structural Equation Modeling  
Dependent Variables  
Explicit Contracts  Relational Reliability 
 
Independent Variables 
 M1   M2  
Control Variables  b t-value  b t-value 
 Exchange duration         .11* (2.30) 
 Foreign ownership     .16** (2.92)    
 Business group -.07 (-.77)      .31** (5.06) 
 Firm size -.01 (-.10)  -.07 (-1.52) 
 Mechanics  -.03 (-.57)   .02 (.34) 
 Heavy   .10 (1.54)   .05 (.90) 
 Electronics  .08 (1.24)   .03 (.51) 
 Urban location    .02 (.30)   .00 ( .02) 
 Political ties  -.08 (-1.44)  .10 (1.50) 
Direct Effects       
 Asset specificity (AS)    -.22** (-3.12)  -.01 (-.42) 
 Environmental uncertainty (EU)  .10 (1.24)       .16** (2.85) 
 Behavioral uncertainty (BU) -.09 (-.85)     -.26** (-4.59) 
 Legal enforceability (LE)      .19** (3.08)  -.03 (-.48) 
 Contract       .14* (2.06) 
Relational reliability       .25** (3.14)    
Interactions       
AS × LE H1a:      .22** (3.32) H2a: -.17** (-3.18) 
EU × LE H1b:   .13* (2.33) H2b: -.15** (-3.10) 
BU × LE H1c:    .13* (2.34) H2c: .11* (2.26) 
Contract × LE    H3b:   -.14* (2.13) 
    Relational reliability × LE H3a:  .06 (.99)    
pseudo-R2    .21    .39  
Model Fit: 2(539) = 1144, p < .001; GFI = .90, CFI = .92, IFI = .92; RMSEA = .053, p(close fit) = .12  
       
** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed). 
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Figure 2 Decomposing the Interaction Effects 
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Appendix: Measurement Items and Validity Assessment* 
Asset specificity: CR = .938, AVE = .752, HSV = .150 Factor loading 
Your firm may have made investments in time, energy, and/or money specifically to accommodate 
this supplier and its products. These investment would be lost if your firm switched to another 
supplier. Please indicate the extent to which your firm has made investments or changes 
specifically to accommodate this supplier (1 = none, 7 = a great deal).  
1. Just for this supplier, we have changed our product’s features. 
2. Just for this supplier, we have changed our personnel. 
3. Just for this supplier, we have changed our inventory and distribution. 
4. Just for this supplier, we have changed our marketing strategy. 
5. Just for this supplier, we have changed our capital equipment and tools. 
 
 
 
 
.804 
.862 
.891 
.905 
.870 
Environmental uncertainty: CR = .872, AVE = .582, HSV = .150  
In this supply market, the following factors are changing (1 = very infrequently, 7 = very 
frequently).  
1. Pricing. 
2. Product feature and specifications. 
3. Vendor support services. 
4. Technology used by suppliers. 
5. Product supply. 
 
.551 
.817 
.844 
.867 
.690 
Behavioral uncertainty: CR = .886, AVE = .662, HSV = .112   
1. It is difficult to measure the collective performance of this supplier. 
2. Evaluating the performance of this supplier requires extensive incoming inspection. 
3. It is difficult to evaluate if this supplier follows our recommended operating procedures. 
4. We have accurate reports about this supplier’s activities. (r) 
5. Our evaluation of this supplier is based on quite accurate information. (r) 
.881 
.821 
.881 
.651 
** 
Relational reliability : CR = .859, AVE = .611, HSV = .112  
1. This supplier is trustworthy. 
2. This supplier has always been evenhanded in its negotiation with us. 
3. This supplier never uses opportunities that arise to profit at our expense. 
4. We are not hesitant to transact with this supplier when the specifications are vague. 
.830 
.891 
.821 
.535 
Explicit contracts: CR = .913, AVE = .725, HSV = .092  
In dealing with this supplier, our contracts precisely defines 
1. the role of each party. 
2. the responsibilities of each party. 
3. how each party is to perform. 
4. what will happen in the case of event occurring unplanned. 
5. how disagreements will be resolved. 
 
.825 
.917 
.920 
.730 
.816 
Legal enforceability: CR = .896, AVE = .744, HSV = .032  
In our business operations: 
1. The legal system protects our interests. 
2. The legal system ensures customers pay. 
3. The legal system ensures we can get our money back. 
.750 
.983 
.839 
  
Model Fit: 2(393) = 676.95, p < .001; GFI = .92, CFI = .95, IFI = .95; RMSEA = .049, p(close fit) = .61 
Notes: CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted; HSV = highest shared variance 
with other constructs; r = reverse-coded 
* All the scales, unless otherwise specified, were measured with a seven-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
**Item deleted from further analysis due to low factor loading.  
